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Economics of Kashmir Confict 
In a political confict like Kashmir, human
loss is the frst tragedy coupled with the
economic damage to the oppressed class.
Repeated shutdowns that include curfews
and protests have dented the economy of
Kashmir, a fact that is irrefutable. However,
this is supplemented by the ‘normalcy period’
that paves way for the economic captivity of
the region. The Narendra Modi government’s
decision to abrogate Article 370, which
guaranteed a special status to Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K) under the Indian constitution,
and divide the J&K state into two separate
Union Territories on 05 August 2019 has
already immensely dented the local economy
to the tune of 17878 crore of Indian rupees.
The decision is expected to further tarnish
the economy of J&K, an economy which could
have been enhanced to serve the needs of
local people and the developmental project
of the state. In the past, there were instances
when the state’s economic potential was
compromised (e.g., the agreement between
Bilal A. Pandow 
Reserve Bank of India and Government of J&K),
which furthered the state’s dependence on New
Delhi. In an ofcial report, the state government
admited that the confict has condensed
per capita Gross Domestic Product growth,
Foreign Domestic Investment infow, exports,
and trade fow in the state. The report also
mentioned that J&K lost 16000 crore during the
unrest of 2016. During the years 2016 and 2017,
168 curfews were imposed in nine districts of
J&K, resulting in huge fnancial loss to locals.
In 2019, the region witnessed the longest ever
communication blockade of 214 days, resulting
in huge losses to local businesses, and in some
cases even closures. The cost of the Kashmir
confict is difcult to ascertain due to limited
studies on the subject and non-availability of
data. In this paper, I document the economic
cost of the Kashmir confict and the efects of
Indian imperialism on the region’s society and
economy using a confict economics framework. 
Keywords: confict; economy; Kashmir; politics; military 
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Introduction 
The difficulty of having a traditional economic perspective
in contexts of conflict has been a challenge for researchers.
The fact that economics as a discipline focuses on gains and
exchange of trade, which takes place in a win-win scenario,
ignores the environment specified with imperfect enforced
property rights. This is the ground where conflict arises. 
The valley of Kashmir is one of the biggest and bloodiest 
conflicts in Asia and the most incomprehensible military 
occupation in the world (Ali et al. 2011: 10). The region 
has been a disputed territory since 1947 (Bhan 2016: 4). 
The United Nations, in its resolution on 21 April 1948, 
asked both India and Pakistan to resolve the question of 
accession of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) through democratic 
means of free and impartial plebiscite (United Nations 
1948: 4). The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation––the 
second largest intergovernmental organization with a 
membership of fifty-seven states––in its 44th Session of 
the Council of Foreign Ministers passed a unanimous 
resolution reaffirming the right of the people of J&K to 
self-determination and the final disposition of the conflict 
to be made in accordance with the will of the people 
(Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 2017: 21). 
The independence movement of Kashmir has roots in the 
1930s against the Dogra regime and India’s control after 
1947. The massive rigging of the 1987 state legislative 
assembly elections by the Indian authorities resulted in 
the loss of the Muslim United Front—Kashmiri parties 
supporting the right to self-determination who were 
expected to form a majority government. Kashmiris tried 
and failed in 1987 to achieve their just objective of the 
right to self-determination through democratic means 
that resulted in an armed struggle for the independence 
of Kashmir. On 31 July 1989, two bomb blasts in Srinagar, 
the summer capital of J&K, started the armed struggle in 
Kashmir (Sikand 2001: 219). 
In 2008, Kashmir witnessed a shift from armed struggle to
peaceful protest to achieve the rights of the people when
the All Parties Hurriyat Conference called for agitation to
protest on the transfer of land to Shri Amarnath Shrine
Board (SASB). The Amarnath land row erupted when 800
kanals (Urdu, Ud); a unit of land equal to 5445 square feed)
of land at Baltal in South Kashmir was deliberated to be
transferred to the SASB. However, Kashmiris were not
allowed to protest or have demonstrations peacefully;
instead, thousands were killed, injured, and arrested (Wani,
Suwirta, and Fayeye 2013: 56). This resulted in the revival
of recent armed struggle in the valley. “A youth leader
(India calls him militant) Burhan Wani… was killed in an
encounter with the Indian security forces on 8 July 2016”
(Butt 2016: 43). Also, scholars have highlighted how the
state manages Kashmir by keeping Kashmiris under perma-
nent captivity that limits their choices (Duschinski 2009). 
In recent years, the number of stone pelting incidents is 
on the rise. The perpetual subjugation by the state forces 
provoked civilians, whose political ways of manifestation 
and demands over the decades have been denied, leading 
them to engage in stone pelting. Stone pelting is not meant 
to kill and has not caused any death (Chatterji 2010: 137). 
The mass protests of 2010 and 2016 observed increased 
participation of youth. In both demonstrations, juveniles 
took part in stone pelting (Shah 2019: 8). India’s Ministry 
of Home Affairs, in a statement on the militancy to the 
Rajya Sabha on 07 February 2018, revealed that incidents 
of stone pelting have nearly doubled from 730 in 2015 to 
1999 in 2019. 
The Ministry also reported on the annual details of what 
the state terms ‘security force’ personnel and civilians who 
lost their lives and ‘terrorists’ killed in violent incidents, 
during the past three years in J&K (Minister of Home 
Affairs 2018: 3). From 2015 to 2017, the number of violent 
attacks increased to 342, while the number of civilian 
deaths doubled to 40. 
The conflict has resulted in not only human loss, but also 
an economic loss of the oppressed class. To ascertain the 
financial cost of the conflict, it is imperative to go through 
the previous scholarship in this area. Haavelmo’s (1954) 
study one of the pioneering works in the field of conflict 
economics. The study modeled the fundamental choice 
between appropriation and production in a general-equi-
librium setting. However, over the past few decades, there 
has been progress in placing appropriation and conflict 
discourse in economic discipline into a larger perspective. 
Weapons are still considered to be a vital part of any 
conflict, and an economic perspective considers weapon 
as inputs. Unlike the case of traditional economics where 
inputs are used to produce useful outputs, conflict situa-
tions use weapons to inflict adversaries on the other party, 
which results in a win and loss of the parties involved. 
Hirshleifer (1989: 110) termed such a function as “technol-
ogies of conflict” and provided mathematical models for 
analysis and computation of the probability of win and loss 
of the parties. 
In the case of the Kashmir conflict, the “technologies of 
conflict” model would predict the win of India and losses 
for Kashmir, given the quantity and variety of the weapons 
India is in possession of. However, in empirical studies 
wherein the relationship between military expenditure 
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and economic growth using panel data of 36 developing 
countries were examined, there were significant and 
adverse effects of defense expenditure on economic 
growth in India (Hou 2009: 4). 
The basic rent-seeking model by Nitzan (1994) highlights 
the rationality of the relationship between the parties 
while contesting for a given resource. In this case, the two 
contesting parties are India and Pakistan, while Kashmir 
is the resource. However, in a revolutionary situation, the 
optimal behavior of parties lacks, which is not the case 
for the traditional neoclassical economic framework. The 
nonexistence of a higher authority to which each party is 
answerable makes enforcement of contract and the terms 
of the economic relations challenging. Also, there are an 
ample number of agreements that define the economic 
relationship between Kashmir and India which cannot be 
analyzed in the traditional economic framework, given the 
anarchic state and financial standing of Kashmir. 
The quantum of the finances that India is spending to hold
Kashmir has time and again been questioned by intellec-
tuals like Arundhati Roy. The amount of public finances
needed to maintain the military occupation of Kashmir
could be spent on improving public services and infrastruc-
tures like hospitals, schools, and food for malnourished
populations in India. “India needs azadi [Ud; independence] 
from Kashmir just as much if not more than Kashmir needs
azadi from India” (Ali et al. 2011: 43). 
In addition to having financial implications, the occupa-
tion has fractured the human relationships between Delhi 
and Kashmir. A study examined how the mass participa-
tion in protests and mass presentation of collective grief 
in the Kashmir valley shows a long history of desire for the 
sovereignty of the J&K (Malik I 2018). India’s occupation 
of Kashmir has also broken the historical trade routes. 
J&K used to act as an essential trade-transit, linking the 
undivided India with the whole of central Asia through the 
silk route (Pandow 2017: 4). 
The government of India has not allowed true democ-
racy to be established in J&K state. Elections, which have
provided a façade of democracy, have functioned to install
individuals representing the interests of the Indian state
whose focus was to please their masters in New Delhi
and not the economic development of the state (Butt and
Pandow 2012). Scholars have also addressed the ways in
which India has offered Kashmiris the choice between
political demands and economic development to shadow
the state violence and militarization. This exposes India’s
status as an emerging postcolonial power that seeks
to doggedly possess Kashmir (Kaul 2018: 13). There are
instances where rights have been refigured, as in the case
of Hill Councils in Kargil (Bhan 2009: 71-93). Scholars have
also explained how locals fear for the loss of territorial
sovereignty that would pave way for settler-colonialism,
and rampant exploitation of economic resources that
would result in neocolonial mal-development (Zia 2020: 60). 
Although a recent survey conducted by Conciliation 
Resources notes that the desire across the divided Kashmir 
region can be different, some uniting factors on which 
both sides agree are economic development, participation, 
and local control (Conciliation Resources 2016: 18). It has 
also been argued that Sadhbhanava, the military operation 
meant to promote “people-oriented programs” involving a 
significant sum of funds, has been used as a tool to manage 
the anger of local people against the loss of land, death, 
and injury. The military, through this program, has made 
inroads into local communities and made them financially 
dependent on the Indian state (Zia 2014: 307). These oper-
ations further legitimized the army’s role in governance 
and civil-society in post-colonial democratic-states like 
India (Aggarwal and Bhan 2009: 519). 
The basic premise of the literature on conflict economics 
is that concerned parties, most of the time, face a trade-off 
between producing goods and seizing goods from others. 
This paper focuses on this tradeoff between appropria-
tion and production by studying the interaction between 
parties under anarchy. There have been many models 
given by economists at various times and have contrib-
uted to the literature on conflict economics (Anderton 
and Carter 2009; Brauer and William 2017; Esteban and 
Ray 1999; Garfinkel 1990; Grossman 1991; Grossman and 
Kim 1996; Skaperdas 1992; Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2006; 
Hartley 2006; Hartley and Sandler 2012; Mehlum, Moene, 
and Torvik 2003; Wittman 2000). Although these works 
provide a detailed review of the literature at a global level, 
there have been negligible contributions from emerging 
economies like India and Pakistan. 
In this paper, I apply conflict economics to the situation 
in Kashmir by examining various economic sectors that 
the government of India, through various apparatuses, 
has employed to take control of varied resources during 
normal times (or lull periods) followed by vicious cycles of 
violence. The analysis considers efforts to control water 
resources, land, financial institutions, and many other 
resources. 
Abrogation of Article 370 
On August 5, 2019, the Narendra Modi government 
initiated the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian 
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constitution and the division of the J&K state into two 
separate Union Territories: Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir. 
Legal experts viewed it as an attack on the constitution 
(Peerzada 2019). Some have even termed it a ‘dictator-
ship’ on the part of the government of India (Pandey and 
Tripathi 2020: 9). Not allowing any sort of dissent, the 
government of India arrested thousands of locals and even 
placed three former chief minsters (pro-Indian politician) 
of J&K under arrest. Their arrest happened immediately 
following their condemnation of the decision which they 
termed as India’s betrayal towards Kashmiris (BBC 2019). 
Immediately after the revocation of the Article, the 
government of India opened up the gates for businessmen 
from mainland Indian to invest in J&K, and many of them 
were enthralled by the move (Behl 2019). To date, the 
government failed to convince and attract foreign invest-
ments to Kashmir. In a recent visit to Kashmir, foreign 
envoys from various countries have mentioned that 
Kashmir is beautiful, but not conducive for investments 
(Ganai 2020). Meanwhile, scholar have always opposed the 
state’s opening of economic sectors like tourism to the 
outside investor, as it could cause environmental degrada-
tion (Navlakha 2007: 4034-4038). 
This unilateral decision is seen as a loss of territorial
sovereignty, and researchers believe that the move will
pave the way for settler-colonialism to lead to rampant
exploitation of resources, which would result in neocolonial
mal-development (Zia 2020: 1). Researchers have called for
solidarity with Kashmir in the context of growing capitalism
that indicates a colonial formation (Goldie 2019: 2). Within
few months of revocation of the Article 370, businessmen
from outside the region started encroaching on the local
resources that otherwise were exclusively meant for the
locals. In the region, there are around 554 mineral blocks,
each measuring a maximum of ten hectares, that were audi-
tioned (Javaid 2020: 1). In 2020, the majority of mining rights
in Kashmir were secured by outside firms, as many local
contactors could not file their applications for e-auctions
due to the government’s order on restrictive communica-
tion in Kashmir (Parvaiz 2020:1). Similarly, on 12 August
2019, Mukesh Ambani, the owner of Reliance Industries and
India’s richest man, announced his company would setup a
taskforce meant for investment in J&K (Thakurta 2019). 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, in its report on the 
stripping of Article 370, forecasts, “The costs of the move 
are more likely to be felt within India. We remain doubtful 
that the change in status will deliver either economic 
dividends or the closer relationship between J&K and India 
that the BJP is aiming for. More certain, however, is that 
the move will do considerable damage to security and 
political stability within the Kashmir Valley” (2019). 
Hydro-economics and confict 
Jammu & Kashmir’s rights over one of the most precious 
natural resources, water capital, were taken away by New 
Delhi through the infamous Indus Water Treaty of 1960, 
which was mediated by the World Bank. The International 
Water Management Institute has stated that the Indus 
Water Treaty deprived J&K state of approximately 6500 
crore1 annually, and that the treaty has negatively affected 
the power-generation and agriculture-potential of the 
state (Iqbal 2018: 8). Also, scholars have argued how citizen 
activism has furthered and strengthened the state’s ability 
use and manage Kashmir’s water resources (Bhan and 
Trisal 2016). 
The treaty governs the usage of the waters of the Indus 
river basin. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 (IWT) was 
signed on 19 September 1960, by India’s Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s President Mohammad 
Ayub Khan, and mediated by World Bank Vice President 
W. A. B. Iliff. The Indus river systems’ annual flow is double 
that of the Nile and three times that of the Tigris and 
Euphrates combined. The IWT allocated the waters of the 
three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej to India. While 
the waters of the three western rivers Indus, Jhelum, and 
Chenab were for Pakistan, the treaty provided provisions 
that India could use some of the waters for purposes of 
hydro-power, irrigation, and other uses (World Bank 1960). 
The waters of the Indus basin have a direct bearing on 
the economic development of J&K. Kashmir, which is the 
primary issue of contention between India and Pakistan, 
has been affected by the IWT. The western rivers of the 
Indus basin, which the treaty establishes are meant for the 
exclusive use of Pakistan, flow through J&K, resulting in 
the restricted use of these waters for the purpose of power 
generation and irrigation (Sahni 2006). In 2002, J&K’s legis-
lative assembly unanimously passed a resolution calling 
for a dissolution of the IWT, which restricts the usage of 
the waters from western-rivers and unlawfully restrains 
the development of the state (Zawahri and Michel 2018). 
Researchers have also studied how dams in Kashmir have 
deprived locals of their own resources while curbing their 
freedom and capability to move freely in a space now 
under military control (Bhan 2018). Dams displace about 
362 families and takes 533 acres of land for fueling India’s 
growing economy (Bhan 2014: 191). New Delhi’s apparatus 
through which the state controls resources like water 
includes India’s hydropower generation company, National 
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S. 
No 
NHPC Project & 
State 
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Design 
Energy 
(MU) 
Year of 
commissioning 
Capital 
Cost as of 
31.03.18 
Tariff 
(18-19) 
(INR /Kwh) 
1 Salal, (6x115) 690 3082 1987 (Nov) 1012.93 2.36 
2 Uri-I, (4x120) 480 2587.38 1997 (Apr) 3440.88 2.1 
3 Dulhasti, (3x130) 390 1906.8 2007 (Mar) 5219 6 
4 Sewa-II, (3x40) 120 533.53 2010 (Jun) 1156.3 4.52* 
5 Chutak , (4x11) 44 212.93 2013 (Jan) 939.9 8.45 
6 Nimoo Bazgo, 
(3x15) 
45 239.33 2013 (Jan) 1062.05 9.79 
7 Uri –II, (4x60) 240 1123.77 2014 (Feb) 2433.77 5.61 
8 Kishanganga 
(3x110) 
330 1712.96 2018 (Mar) 5755.24 3.54* 
Total 2339 11398.7 21020.0.7 
Table 1: National Hydro 
Power Corporation 
operational projects in 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Source: Author compilation 
(National Hydro Power 
Corporation 2018) 
Note: *provisional estimate 
Installed Capacity Design Energy 
Projects (MW) (MUs) Cost (In Cr.) & PL 
Pakal Dul (4x250) J&K 1000 3330.18 8112 (Mar 13) 
Table 2: Joint venture NHPC project 
under construction 
Source: Author compilation (National 
Hydro Power Corporation 2018) 
Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC). The J&K government 
considers the NHPC to be exploitative, draining the state’s 
power potential as the “East-India-Company of New 
Delhi” (Ali 2011; Dar 2012). New Delhi owes 20000 crore 
to J&K State for using their water as a reparation for the 
power-generated from their resources (Bashir 2015). 
As illustrated in Table 1, the total installed2 capacity of the 
NHPC operational project throughout India as of June, 2018 
stands at 5451 megawatts (MW), while the total installed 
capacity from J&K is 42.9%. Also, the company is operating 
eight projects in J&K with a cumulative capacity of 2339 
MW, which is over one third of the total hydro-power 
generated by the company in other states (Ali 2018). This 
means that Kashmir’s water is a gold mine which the 
government of India is exploiting to the fullest. 
In addition, the NHPC has another project under construc-
tion in J&K: Pakal Dul, a hydroelectric project under 
construction in the village of Drangdhuran in J&K with 
an installed capacity of 1000MW. The project is currently 
under development by Chenab Valley Power Projects 
as a joint venture between NHPC (49% stake), Jammu & 
Kashmir State Power Development Corporation (49% 
stake), and Power Trading Corporation India (2% stake) 
(see Table 2). 
According to the NHPC (2018), the power-house package
has been awarded, and the work on the dam has started.
The bidding process for the other works is under prog-
ress. The NHPC has other joint venture projects currently
awaiting clearance, such as Kiru, with an installed capacity
of 624 MW, and Kwar, with an installed capacity of 540 MW. 
According to the NHPC (ibid), forest clearance has been 
approved by the state forest department of state govern-
ment, and environment clearance granted by Ministry of 
Environment, Forest and Climate Change Government of 
India (MoEF). Regarding Kwar, the environment clearance 
has been granted by MoEF, and the state forest depart-
ment has granted the forest clearance. And one of the 
NHPC projects, Bursar, is in the pipeline having an 800MW 
capacity for which Detailed Project Reports have been 
submitted to the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) and 
are currently under examination by the CEA and Central 
Water Commission (ibid). 
With the stripping of the Article 370, New Delhi, through 
NHPC, is speeding up the hydropower projects as the 
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government directly control the region. The projects 
includes 800MW Bursar3 and 850MW Ratle4, the latter 
coming up at an investment of around 6,215.61 crore 
(Bhaskar 2019). 
As stated above, these NHPC projects are exploitative in
nature, resulting in economic losses to J&K. The geographic
locations of the projects are also troublesome because
the region is categorized in vulnerable seismic zones IV
and V, which are prone to earthquakes. This makes these
dams susceptible to earthquakes, thereby risking the lives
of locals. The NHPC and the central government are least
bothered about the risks, but rather interested in expan-
sion and controlling water resources of J&K. 
Despite such a grim situation, there is a silver lining of coop-
eration, giving peace a chance for the greater good of South
Asia. Some studies (e.g., Hassana, Afridi, and Khan 2017)
suggest the need for environmental diplomacy to initiate
negotiation, trust-building, and regional cooperation to
have peace and sustainable development. Another study
(Hussain 2016) suggests the need for hydro-diplomacy by
bringing the stakeholders of South Asian countries together
for cooperation on the Indus basin river system. This would
mean just and equitable distribution of natural resources. 
Land grab and occupation 
India’s control over J&K is not restricted to water 
resources, as the government of India through its army 
and other forces have occupied vast swaths of land as well. 
Although it is difficult and challenging to ascertain the 
actual quantity of the property in possession by the Indian 
army and other allied forces in J&K, it is possible to gauge 
the phenomenon of the substantial land grab in J&K. 
The Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) indi-
cates that the current deployment of regular Indian army
and other forces in J&K is estimated to be over 700,000
personnel (Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society 2015:
35), turning the region into the largest militarized deploy-
ment in the world, with one armed personnel for seventeen
civilians. Also, there are studies that suggest presence of
Indian troops, with a ratio of one soldier for every eight
Kashmiris (Zia 2019: 1037). Moreover, there has been an
emergence of a new form of military, multilateral, and
humanitarian occupations that reinforces institutionalized
vehemence against occupied people (Duschinski and Bhan
2017). 
The stationing of this colossal army has resulted in the 
land grab of diverse topographies, including forests, hills, 
glaciers, mountains, stream beds, paddy fields, and periph-
eries of lakes, in both urban and rural settings, thereby 
establishing permanent military structures. The exact 
figure of land under Indian armed forces in J&K is highly 
disputed, as huge chunks of the area remain illegally 
occupied, which was never officially demarcated, requi-
sitioned, leased, mutated, or attained under the J&K Land 
Acquisition Act (Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society 
2015: 37). 
During Omar Abdullah’s tenure (2009-2015) as Chief Minister
of J&K, the J&K government admitted in the state assembly
that in the three regions of Ladakh, Kashmir, and Jammu,
the army has occupied 1,054,721 kanals of land. At that time,
the Indian military illegally occupied 855,407 kanals of land
and had legal rights over 199,314 kanals that had been trans-
ferred by the state government to the army (Milli Gazette
2013; Nabi and Ye 2015). More recently, Chief Minister
Mehbooba Mufti (2015-2018) claimed that more than 4.3
lakh5 kanals of land in J&K is under the illegal occupation
of Indian army and other military forces stationed in the
state. The Chief Minister, on record, informed the legislative
assembly that 51,116 kanals of state land in Jammu province
and 379,817 kanals of land in Kashmir and Ladakh are under
unauthorized occupation of the Indian army (Wani 2018). 
The JKCCS (2015: 38) documents that the occupation is 
not limited to land only, but also includes 1,856 buildings, 
including 1,526 private buildings, 280 government build-
ings, 14 industrial units, give cinemas, and 28 hotels. The 
irony is that most of the owners of these establishments 
have not been paid rent and that whenever the military 
has paid rent, it is negligible compared to the real worth of 
the property under the occupation. The Public Commission 
on Human Rights in 2005 identified 46 schools and educa-
tional establishments occupied by armed forces (Public 
Commission on Human Rights 2005: 39). 
Indian authorities have furthered the occupation by 
acquiring land through agencies such as the National 
Highway Authority of India, Indian Railways, and others 
in the name of improved connectivity and development. 
There have also been forcible land acquisitions for projects 
including highway and railways (Bhat 2018). In addition, 
the Defense Ministry of India billed the J&K government 
500 crore last year for its assistance in carrying out rescue 
and relief operations during the devastating floods in the 
valley in September 2014 (Press Trust of India 2018). 
In a report by the Oakland Institute Research Team, in 
context of scrapping of the Article 370, the researchers call 
the investment could be a “Trojan horse for forcing the 
demographic composition of Kashmir” and adds that this 
move resembles to that of the “illegal Israeli settlements in 
Palestine’s West Bank” (Mittal 2019). 
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The government of India is using occupation as a tool 
to disempower residents of Kashmir. As stated above, 
military rule has systematically furthered the land grab, 
making inhabitation hard for the locals and rendering the 
population dispossessed. It does not end here, as Delhi uses 
other apparatuses like controlling financial institutions to 
strengthen their hold on Kashmir. 
Control over fnancial institutions 
The Indian state, over decades, has gradually and system-
atically used numerous measures to ensure economic 
imperialism of the J&K, which has included control over 
of the local financial institution, the Jammu and Kashmir 
Bank Limited (JKB). The JKB was incorporated on 01 
October 1938 and started its operation on 04 July 1939. The 
JKB was the first state-owned bank established as a govern-
ment company under the Companies Act 1956 operating as 
“bankers to the state government” (Hussain 2014). 
In April 2011, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) entered into
a supplementary agreement under section 21A of the RBI
Act of 1934 with the government of J&K to carry out their
banking business. Through this agreement, RBI became
the lone agent for the investment of the state government
funds, which JKB had previously performed for the state
as banker to the state government, while the JKB became
an agent of the RBI for the conduct of general banking
business of the J&K state government. The agreement
between the state government of J&K and the Reserve
Bank of India has two critical aspects: one financial and
one political. 
Regarding the financial aspect, in the past, JKB acted as a 
critical contributor to the financial stability of J&K through 
overdrafts. The state government used to borrow as much 
as 1500 crore from the JKB to meet its various obligations 
by the Ways & Means Account, a necessary practice due to 
delayed financial assistance from New Delhi. It enabled the 
government of J&K to manage the temporary mismatches 
between expenditures and receipts. In the years following 
the agreement, the state’s treasuries bills over 450 crore 
were pending for payment in Kashmir (Akmali 2014). Also, 
the bank used to have highest Credit Deposit ratio at forty-
three percent, while the national banks used to have same 
at twenty-three percent, thereby indicating that banks 
used to invest money outside the state owing to discour-
aging government policies for private investments in the 
state (Navlakha 2005: 349-351). 
Regarding the political aspect, the agreement pushed the 
J&K government further towards total dependence on New 
Delhi, resulting in economic subjugation. Hussain (2010) 
argues that the state government would have to often 
visit New Delhi with a “begging-bowl for petty-finances.” 
Also, the then opposition party, Peoples Democratic Party, 
termed the move as the most lethal nail in the coffin 
of J&K’s autonomy by the then ruling party, National 
Conference. 
More recently, the state administrative council headed by 
J&K governor S.P. Malik has turned JKB into a Public Sector 
Bank, which has meant taking away its independence and 
making it answerable to the J&K state legislature (Jaleel 
and Iqba 2018). This act also and brought JKB under the 
realm of the J&K Right to Information Act6 and the Central 
Vigilance Commission7. 
Time and again, political interventions by the government 
of India have not only affected the premier financial insti-
tution of the state, JKB, but have also had adverse impact 
on the overall economy of Kashmir. This is worsened 
by the frequent curfews and shutdowns which further 
distress J&K’s economy. 
The bank has lost all its autonomy that it used to derive 
under the Article 370. Also, the bank has undergone much 
restructuring, and all the shareholding that the state used 
to own are now owned by New Delhi since the revocation 
of the Article (Sidhartha 2019). 
Economics of shutdowns 
The recurrent curfews and protests are ruining the state’s 
economy, a fact that cannot be denied. However, the 
‘normalcy’ in the state acts as a device for New Delhi to 
push J&K further into economic captivity. The state has 
long been using the economic losses due to the frequent 
protest and unrest in Kashmir as a ploy to placate the azadi
sentiment among the locals. 
An examination of the modalities of the economics of 
shutdowns leads to findings that contradict the state’s 
narrative on substantial economic losses. Hussain (2016) 
provides insights on the frequency of major unrests that 
took place in Kashmir since June 2008, including the 
Amarnath land row in 2008, Shopian rape and murder case 
in 2009, the summer turmoil in 2010, and the uprising in 
2016. Regarding the uprising in the year 2016, the govern-
ment of J&K projected the losses due to the unrest at over 
16000 crore for a period of five months from July 8 to 
November 30 (PTI 2017). In 2010, the government claimed 
losses of 21,000 crore for 85 days (Jehangir 2010). 
During 2013, the state claimed losses of 4,500 crore over 
26 days of curfew following the hanging of Afzal Guru 
(Bhattacharya 2016). Contrary to the government’s claims, 
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Table 3: Financial losses due to internet shutdowns in Kashmir 
(Malik S 2018b; Sofware Freedom Law Centre, India 2020) 
Year Losses (INR Crore) No. of Shutdowns 
2012 23 3 
2013 1088 5 
2014 N/A 5 
2015 423 5 
2016 655 10 
2017 1776 32 
2018 N/A 65 
2019 N/A 55 
a careful analysis of these figures reveals the flawed and 
fabricated nature of the state’s narrative on the economic 
losses–a ploy used by inflating these figures to divert the 
public attention from the real losses and the loot suffered 
by J&K through its various apparatuses. 
Hussain (2010) provides a detailed analysis showing that 
the gross state domestic product (GSDP) of around 38000 
crore suggests that the state produces goods and services 
worth 104 crore daily. The main impact of the unrest is 
in Kashmir valley, and it comprises almost 50 percent 
of the GSDP, or 50 crore daily. The tertiary sectors of 
the economy are the main hit in the conflict situation 
like Kashmir. The primary and secondary sectors of the 
economy, which are the backbone of J&K’s economy, had a 
negligible impact due to the unrest. According to Hussain 
(ibid), the ongoing political turmoil has resulted in losses 
of twenty to 25 daily crore; for 80 days, the loss would 
go 1600 crore and not 21000 crore, defying the state’s 
narrative. 
Since J&K is a consumer economy, political unrest in the 
valley causes considerable losses to the states that export 
various products to J&K. The poultry farmers in north 
India, mostly in Punjab, were severely affected. Some esti-
mates suggest that these poultry traders export over half 
a million eggs and around fifty thousand chickens a day 
to meet the vast demand of J&K. These imports cost about 
fifty million rupees a day. As 90 percent of the poultry 
farmers from Punjab are dependent on the exports to 
Kashmir, any political unrest in the valley cost these states 
heavily compared to the Kashmir (ibid). 
As demonstrated in Table 3, frequent internet shutdowns 
also impact daily activities (BRIEF 2017: 11). Due to the 
frequent internet blackout by the government, J&K 
suffered losses amounting to 4000 crore between 2012 and 
2017 (Malik S 2018a). 
The undeclared internet shutdowns also hamper busi-
ness growth, particularly in information technology and 
related fields in the valley. JKCCS documents 42 instances 
of unreasonable curtailments and total suspensions of 
telecommunication and internet rights from 08 July 2016, 
to 31 December 2017, based on reliable news reports and 
first-hand knowledge (Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil 
Society 2017: 32). 
The state government, on 03 April 2019, issued an order 
(353-Home (ISA)) that barred civilian traffic on the 
highway of Srinagar-Jammu on Sundays and Wednesdays 
each week to allow smooth movement of the army convoy. 
The economic experts expect huge loss owing to this 
blockade order. 
According to a report issued by the Kashmir Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the abrogation of Article 370 has 
affected business immensely and dented the local economy 
to the tune of 17878 crore (Kashmir Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 2019: 6). This decision forced 340,000 tour-
ists to leave within 24 hours and resulted in a loss to the 
tourism sector, which contributes eight percent to the 
state’s GDP. Local players also suffered immensely (Sharma 
2019). It also caused closure or hefty loss of business to the 
twelve information telecommunication companies who 
employ around 1500 people in the Kashmir valley (Wani 
2019). 
Cross Line-of-Control trade 
In 2008, the governments of India and Pakistan opened the 
Line of Control (LoC) for limited trade as a measure aimed 
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at building confidence between the different sides in J&K. 
On 21 October 2008, the first truck drivers and traders met 
on the Chakothi-Uri Bridge in Kashmir. After six decades 
of violent conflict and the absence of any connection 
between the two sides, this marked a fundamental step for 
trust building and peacebuilding in the region. Due to its 
broad appeal, cross-LoC trade has sustained, even during 
periods of heightened political tension and unrest in the 
region. Ten years later, cross-LoC trade remains a barter 
trade limited to specific goods. The registration process 
is lengthy, and the numerous checks for the truck drivers 
make it a cumbersome process. 
Cross-border trade offers livelihood and business oppor-
tunities while also increasing cultural exchanges and 
connections of divided families. The villages where 
cross-LoC trade takes place have seen reduced violence, 
renewed economic activity, and lives transformed (Pentori 
2018). When trade along the Poonch-Rawalakot crossing 
was stopped in July 2017, local lobbying efforts were 
able to push and advocate for its reopening four months 
later. Without the intangible benefits behind it and the 
symbolism it holds for local communities, it most likely 
would not have prevailed. 
Trade volumes across the LoC have shown an upsurge from 
2008 to 2015, with the trade of goods worth 699 million US 
dollars. The cross-LoC trade has also fetched perceptible 
financial paybacks to the traders and other associated 
stakeholders (Hussain and Sinha 2016). The cross-LoC trade 
has crossed 5000 crore mark in 2018 since its inception on 
21 October 2008, and is emerging as the significant confi-
dence-building-measure (Ehsan 2018). India’s order on 18 
April 2019 to suspend the cross-LoC trade (particularly 
after the scrapping of the Article 370) left 1700 traders in 
distress. The local business community sees no hope that 
the trade would be restored (Khajuria 2020). 
Conclusion 
Although It is difficult to ascertain the cost of conflict 
in Kashmir due to the limited literature and non-avail-
ability of data, it can be concluded that the ‘normalcy’ is 
furthering the clutch of India’s economic imperialism in 
Kashmir. The government of India, through many of its 
apparatuses in J&K, facilitated the state to take control 
over numerous resources during the normal times—lull 
periods before another violent period. 
The occupation includes control on water resources, land 
grabs, and control of the state’s financial institution. The 
precious cost that Kashmiris suffer is in terms of human 
loss (i.e., figures of an exact number of casualties due to 
the conflict) are not precise and are contested by both 
sides. Take the case of the Indus Water Treaty: the state 
suffers on an average of 6500 crore annually. On account 
of frequent internet shutdowns, Kashmir suffered losses 
amounting to 4000 crore between 2012 and 2017. Of late, 
the scrapping of Article 370 provides New Delhi direct 
control over the stated economic resources thereby 
making it easy for the state to tighten its grip over the 
region and control the descent. 
The state imposes frequent curfews that not only affect the 
normal life of locals but also severely impact the economy 
of the state. The state, in the form of confidence-building 
measures, started LoC trade to showcase it globally. 
However, on the ground, the state has put in numerous 
curbs on the free flow of goods, and in this era of tech-
nology, traders are forced to go for barter trade. 
Though there are many studies which have contributed to 
the existing literature in the field of conflict economics, 
Kashmir has not been a focal point for researchers. The 
data presented in this study allow us to better understand 
the state’s narrative and its implications on the ground, 
as well as how the occupying state uses various appa-
ratuses to control economic resources and disempower 
inhabitants. 
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Endnotes 
1. One crore is equal to ten million. 
2. Maximum output of electricity that a project can 
produce. 
3. Developed on Marusudar River, near village Pakal in 
Kishtwar District. 
4. Hydroelectric project on the run-of-the-river, Chenab 
River. 
5. One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand. 
6. Legislation intended to provide citizens of the state 
with a legal mechanism for obtaining government records. 
7. The apex institution set to monitor all vigilance activity 
under the Central Government. 
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